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BOOK REVIEW 
 
Nadine Ehlers, Racial Imperatives: Discipline, Performativity, and Struggles Against 
Subjection (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012), 185 pages. 
 
Racial Imperatives by the University of Wollongong’s Nadine Ehlers is a thoughtful and 
provocative contribution to the literature of discipline, performativity, and agency as they 
relate to race. Drawing on Foucault’s work from Discipline and Punish, The History of Sexuality 
series and his lectures collected as Society Must Be Defended as well as Judith Butler’s gender 
studies work, Ehlers analyses the 1925 New York court case Rhinelander vs. Rhinelander. In the 
case, Leonard Rhinelander claimed his wife had fraudulently duped him by passing as white 
and covering up her ‘true’ racial identity prior to their marriage. He sought a divorce on these 
grounds. The all male, all white jury found that Alice, his wife, had not lied and after parading 
semi-naked in the courtroom it was obvious to all present that she was indeed ‘black.’ She was 
thus acquitted of fraudulent activity. Ehlers’ highlights this case as a way of discussing 
theoretical issues, and Racial Imperatives is less a work of cultural history than a philosophical 
investigation into passing, masculinity, femininity, responsibility, and negotiation within the 
frame of American race relations in the early twentieth century.  
Divided into six chapters, the book has three sections of two chapters each. The three 
sections correspond to three claims. As Ehlers writes: 
 
The first claim explored is that race operates as a disciplinary regime and that racial subjects 
are formed through racial discipline [...] The second claim […] is that the mechanism 
through which this disciplinary formation is inaugurated and sustained is racial 
performativity, and that all racial subjects can be said to execute a kind of performative 
racial passing. Finally, while discipline and the performative imperatives of race might 
seem to delimit ways of being raced, I examine how subjects can and do struggle against 
subjection and practice new modes of racial becoming (3). 
 
Rhinelander vs. Rhinelander then is a starting point for Ehlers rather than the focus. Racial 
Imperatives reads more as an excursus of Foucault and Butler than a specific close reading of 
one case and its significance. Given the remit of this journal I will focus on some aspects of 
Ehlers’ use of Foucault, even as the majority of Racial Imperatives is indebted to his work.  
Although Ehlers ably covers much of Foucault’s later work, one phrase she quotes—
“the soul is the prison of the body”—seemed worthy of attention. It is a famous and arresting 
phrase and is important not only because of what it suggests about the relationship of 
interiority to exteriority, of its content in other words, but also because of the form that it 
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takes, including specifically of the evocative use of the word “prison,” which reminds us of 
incarceration, confinement, detention, custody and “the inside” itself. Given its position in 
Discipline and Punish, it also reminds us, that we are inside rather than being quartered and 
hung in front of a baying public in the town square. It is a precise phrase so we must then be 
careful to read it as if it were theory and history—if we can make such a distinction. In reading 
it as both, I want to suggest, amongst other things, the simultaneous universality of the 
statement (theory) and its location in a specific time and place (history). Throughout Racial 
Imperatives, Ehlers is attuned to Foucault’s theory, but less so to his history. In other words, she 
seeks from Foucault a vocabulary that can be adapted and applied to a different historical 
situation than that from which it emerged. To readers of this journal, it will be no surprise to 
read of the use of Foucault to understand a different time or place than those he discussed in 
his own writings. It does, though, beg the question: what is an appropriate application of his 
theoretical insights given that he wrote historically? In reading Racial Imperatives, this is a 
recurring question. Ehlers’ use of Foucault is undoubtedly productive, in the sense that it 
contributes to discussions of discipline, race, performance, agency, and resistance. However, it 
is more an application of theory rather than the use of a history to speak back to theory. 
Foucault remains in tact; his work is not corrected, amended, or contested in any major way. 
This may be a result of reading in a way that could, say, place Sander Gilman’s historical 
discussion of blackness in the nineteenth century next to Frantz Fanon’s personal experience 
taken from the mid twentieth century rather than examining the change that occurred 
between these eras (35). Perhaps a closer reading of historical sources could have created 
tensions in the generalizations Foucault made in a way that is radically new. This is not to 
suggest that Ehlers’ extension of Foucault, and to a lesser extent Butler, is not productive. 
Racial Imperatives is indeed a compelling exploration about an intriguing and illuminating 
case, which was one of the top ten news items in New York for its year. My question though is 
to what extent are Foucault’s ideas and terminology elastic and applicable; what is lost and 
gained when we adapt and change theory and history, when we unyoke them from each 
other? That is a question readers of Ehlers’ book should ponder as it may influence their own 
work in more subtle ways than first considered.  
Ehlers’ discussion of performativity, her second claim in other words, is a particularly 
strong part of Racial Imperatives and this is where theory and history are in productive 
dialogue with each other. The case articulates the thinking of Butler as much as Butler’s 
thinking, when read by Ehlers, articulates the case. For readers interested in passing and 
performativity chapter five will be particularly useful. However, can we assume that all 
relations, matrices, and manners of performance are equal? Is it the same type of 
performativity when a person whose discursive racial truth is ‘white’ wears blackface for a 
theatre play compared to a person whose discursive racial truth is ‘African American’ 
pretends to be white in everyday life? I am not suggesting Ehlers makes such a claim, but 
thinking through what constitutes performativity in context might create different 
generalisations. Relying on one case study in particular results in a very particular set of 
claims, and this is where greater dialogue between theory and history might be beneficial. 
This section is followed by the final chapters, which discuss technologies of the self. It 
brings to mind scholarship on the microphysics of power. That is to say, there is an argument 
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for the political importance of gestures, comportments, embodied ways of being, which might 
not immediately strike one as political. Drawing on the work of people like Henry Louis Gates 
Jr., Ehlers argues that ‘resignification’ is regarded as an important tool that can challenge 
power structures. However, “critical practices of resignification are not guaranteed to 
successfully subvert the injurious norms through which hegemonic forms of identity are 
fashioned, but […] this does not rule out the possibility that there are aims and ends that 
might be gauged or anticipated” (135). I wonder about the intent and applicability of this—
what changes when definitions are expanded so that we do not focus on total institutions that 
produce hegemonic forms of identity—prison/prisoner, hospital/patient, military/soldier? 
What happens when we shift our focus from voting booths, street protests, political deaths to 
clothes worn, buses caught, pop music listened to? Arguably they are not irreconcilable 
discourses, but there is a political imperative and importance in recognizing that power, while 
being everywhere, is concentrated in specific locations, positions and people, and those 
specificities speak back to what power is in a general way. Ehlers argues that “for such a 
critique to be practical—in the sense that it ‘achieves’ anything in the concrete reality of one’s 
life—a genealogical investigation of identity must be coupled with an endeavor to craft a new 
embodied reality” (137). But can we imagine a reality that is not embodied? Ehlers is on firmer 
territory advocating the importance of pleasure in this, a pleasure that is disconnected and 
actively disconnects from the intensification of power relations, where the disassembly and 
reassembly of the self through practices enables power to be unfrozen. She is less explicit on 
what this is specifically, or on how pleasure is in and of itself. Perhaps an analysis of how 
Alice or Leonard lived after the trial in a way that sought agency and a productive, even 
revolutionary, negotiation of racial hierarchies, boundaries, hegemonies as they existed in 
1920s America would have been beneficial to her theoretical claims. 
Taken as a whole, Racial Imperatives is a clear and concise contribution. It adequately 
summarizes a wealth of Foucauldian scholarship on discipline and agency and puts his work 
in productive dialogue with Butler’s ideas of performance as they relate to American ideas of 
race in the early twentieth century. However, on occasion historical specificity is avoided on 
account of theoretical discussion. Though, readers in critical race studies, American history, 
legal studies, and those with an interest in Foucault, Butler, discipline, performance, and 
agency will be rewarded by a close reading of it.  
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